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I. Introduction  
 
In various European legal acts the Council has delegated power to the Commission to set 
common policy, conditional on specific procedural requirements, which are commonly known 
as "comitology". In this paper we analyse whether and how far these implementation 
procedures help to overcome a dilemma of delegation,
1 which arises if (a) a principal and an 
agent have conflicting interests and (b) the principal, due to the structure of the principal-agent 
relationship, cannot perfectly control the agent (structure-induced agent discretion).  
 
 
As is well known from the principal-agent literature (see Sappington 1991), conflicting 
interests and information asymmetry allow the agent to choose actions which are inconsistent 
with the preferences of the principal. However, as is often overlooked, conflicting interests and 
asymmetric information are sufficient but not necessary conditions for agent discretion. We 
also have room for agent discretion with perfect and complete information, if the structure of 
the principal-agent relationship allows the agent to deviate from policies preferred by the 
principal. This kind of discretion, that has been labelled by Steunenberg (1996)   s t r u c t u r e 
– i n d u c e d   d i s c r e t i o n , can arise, for example, if the legislature has difficulties in 
deciding collectively on its actions (see also Cooter 2000: 154-161). The legislative process can 
be hampered by majority rule cycles, which the agent may employ to its advantage (Hill 1985). 
Furthermore, new legislation can be blocked if political actors do not agree on any deviation 
from the current agent policy (see Ferejohn and Shipan 1990; Eskridge and Ferejohn 1992). In 
these cases, it is neither a lack of information nor the unwillingness of the legislature to control 
                                                
1 According to Lupia/McCubbins a dilemma of delegation arises if a policy making bureaucracy does not have 
common interests with its principals and possess information about the delegation that their principals lack (see 
Lupia/McCubbins 1998: 214, 79). As for the latter think of information about cause-effect relations, the details of 
existing policies and regulations, the pending decision agenda, and the distribution of benefits and costs of agency 
actions (see McCubbins, Noll, Weingast 1987: 247).  
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agent decisions, but rather the inability to reach legislative agreement that provides the agent 
with the opportunity to select a policy that is closer to its ideal point. 
The "political control" literature distinguishes two general ways of controlling an agent (see 
McCubbins, Noll, Weingast 1987: 243): "oversight", which consists of monitoring, researching, 
and punishing bureaucratic behaviour, and administrative procedures. Due to costs of 
monitoring, limits to sanctions and political costs of sanctions, monitoring and sanctions do not 
comprise a perfect solution to the problem of bureaucratic compliance (see McCubbins, Noll, 
Weingast 1987: 246-253).
2 Administrative procedures "affect the institutional environment in 
which agencies make decisions and thereby limit an agency's range of feasible policy actions". 
As McCubbins, Noll, Weingast (1987) mention, "the point of administrative procedures is not 
to preselect specific policy outcomes, but to create a decisionmaking environment that mirrors 
the political circumstances that gave rise to the establishment of the policy ... If these uses of 
administrative process are effective, the agency, without any need for input, guidance, or 
attention from political principals, is directed toward the decisions its principals would make on 
their own, even if the principals are unaware, ex ante, of what that outcome would be. By 
structuring the rules of the game for the agency, administrative procedures sequence agency 
activity, regulate its information collection and dissemination, limit its available choices, and 
define its strategic advantage." (McCubbins, Noll, Weingast 1987: 255.)
3  
                                                                                                                                                         
 
2 McCubbins, Noll, Weingast (1987: 244) mention hearings, investigations, budget reviews, legislative sanctions 
as means of standard political oversight. According to Lupia/McCubbins (1998: 81-82) the principal has three 
ways of obtaining information about her agent's actions: " direct monitoring of an agent's activities (the principal 
gathers information herself), attending to the agent's self-report of his activities, or attending to third-party 
testimony about the agent's actions."  
3 There is a further advantage mentioned by McCubbins/Noll/Weingast: procedural controls "enable political 
leaders to assure compliance without specifying, or even necessarily knowing, what substantive outcome is most 
in their interest." (1987: 244.)  
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Although oversight plays a role in shaping the relationship between Council and Commission, 
it is of minor importance compared to procedures. When delegating power to the European 
Commission the Council typically does this  conditional on specific procedural requirements. 
These procedures are codified in the Council's so called "comitology" decision.
4 In this 
comitology decision, the Council distinguished three types of procedures: the advisory 
committee procedure, the management committee procedure, and the regulatory committee 
procedure. All these procedures have as a common element bodies of representatives or civil 
servants drawn from the member states. They consult, but also supervise, the Commission's 
execution of legal acts.  
Although advisory committees, management committees and regulatory committees have 
become an integral part of the European institutional structure, there is surprisingly little 
research to be found from a rigorous rational choice perspective. The current comitology 
procedures have been analysed in Steunenberg/Koboldt/Schmidtchen (1996, 1997), using 
a rational choice approach and, more specifically, the tools of non-cooperative game theory. 
Institutional reforms regarding the involvement of the European Parliament are dealt with in 
Steunenberg/Schmidtchen (2000), Steunenberg/Koboldt/Schmidtchen (2000, 1997). However, 
all these contributions focus on the distribution of power in the European Union (see also 
Steunenberg/Schmidtchen/Koboldt 1999). Although we strongly draw on the analytical insights 
derived in these earlier articles the focus has changed from the power issue to the principal-
agent problem. 
                                                
4 Decision of the Council of July 13, 1987 (Official Journal of the European Union 1987: L 197/33). The draft 
treaty of Amsterdam (1997) includes a declaration in which the member states call on the Commission to submit 
to the Council by the end of 1998 a proposal to amend the comitology decision of 1987. On 16 July 1998 the 
Commission submitted a Proposal for a Council Decision laying down the procedures for the exercise of 
implementing powers conferred on the Commission, one of the main objectives being to simplify these procedures 
and reduce the number of possible formulas (see Official Journal 1998, (279/5)). 
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The paper is organised as follows.
5 In section II we present a simple model of structure-induced 
agent discretion. In section III we describe policy making in the EU and point to ways in which 
the Council tries to restrict the discretion of the Commission in implementing European 
policies. In section IV we analyse the current decision making procedures, using a model in 
which the Commission may select a policy that is subject to review by a committee of 
representatives of the member states and the Council. Section V presents a measure of agent 
discretion. It adresses the ability of the Commission to set a policy according to its own 
preferences, given a specific procedure and a variety of possible preference constellations. 
Thus, the better is the outcome of the policy setting game from the perspective of the 
Commission, the worse is the workability of an implementation procedure in solving the 
dilemma of delegation. Section VI concludes. 
                                                
5 The paper is a slightly modified version of a paper entitled "Comitology and the Legislator's Dilemma: On the 
Architecture of Decisionmaking in the European Union" published in Yearbook for New Political Economy 
(Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie), editors: Holler, M., H. Kliemt, D. Schmidtchen, M.E. Streit, vol. 21, 
Tübingen 2002.  
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II. Structure-induced agent discretion  
 
The purpose of this section is to show, how in principle, institutional arrangements like 
committees matter with regard to decision making by an agent. In order to keep things as 
simple as possible we assume simple majority voting although it is not part of the comitology 
procedures. In section IV. dealing with the commission policies under the implementation 
procedures we introduce the more complicated case of qualified majority voting which 
characterises the comitology procedures.  
A legislature delegates policy making authority to an agent and delegates supervision of the 
agent to a committee. The committee is assumed to have gate-keeping power: the only way for 
a policy proposal to come for the legislature is by the committee opening the gate to enable 
policy change or not. We distinguish two rules, according to what the legislature can do if the 
committee opens the gate: with a "take-it-or-leave-it"-rule the legislature may vote the agent 
proposal up or down; under the amendment-rule the legislature may open the floor to 
amendments to the agent proposal.
6 
Let us first assume that the legislature as well as the committee decides under a simple majority 
rule. In this case the median's preferences determine the majority's preferences. In fig. 1(it is 
adopted from Ferejohn/Shipan 1990: 7), assume that A is the ideal point of the agency, the 
median legislature member is at L, and the median member of the committee is located at C. 
C(L) stands for the point of indifference to the legislature median position. That is, median 
member of the Committee prefers a policy of L as much as the alternative policy C(L). 
Additionally q represents the status quo and C(q) the committees' point of indifference to the 
status quo.  
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                                      A     C(L)                     q     C    C(q)                    L 
 
Fig. 1: Gate keeping procedure: simple majority 
In an amendment-rule committee system the agency would not propose to implement any 
policy to the left of C(L) since the committee would open the gate and the legislature would 
amend to be equal to L. If the agency proposed a policy in the interval [C(L), L], the committee 
would not open the gate since the median committee member would (weakly) prefer such 
a policy to the outcome of legislature decision-making, i.e. L. Thus, the subgame perfect 
equilibrium is: the agency proposes x = C(L) and the committee leaves the gate closed. Note 
that if C(L) < A, the agency would choose x = A, a policy which prevails. This holds until A 
￿  
L. If A 
￿  L then x = L. As a general rule, the agency will choose x = max {A, C(L)} for A < L 
(see Ferejohn/Shipan 1970: 7).  
The dilemma of delegation shows up in the difference L – x = max {A, C(L)}. It exists as long 
as C < L. If C = L the agency would choose a proposal x = L and the committee would leave 
the gate closed. Note that the threat by the committee to open the gate if the agency does not 
propose a policy x = C is an empty threat. It will never open the gate if x 
￿  C since opening the 
gate would lead to L, making the committee worse off.  
It is the sequential structure of decision-making which allows the agency to take an action that 
would not command a majority in the committee or the legislature. Three crucial features of 
this sequential policy-making under an amendment-rule committee system must be mentioned 
(see Ferejohn/Shipan 1990: 7, 8, who analyse congressional influence on bureaucracy): "First, 
at least in settings with complete information, in equilibrium the initial agency policy choice is 
never overturned." Second, the equilibrium agency proposal depends on the legislature's and 
                                                                                                                                                         
6 Note that these rules differ from the closed-rule and open-rule committee systems which are typical for US-
congress (see Shepsle, Bonchek 1997: 117). Whereas US committees have got monopoly proposal power in the 
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the committee's preferences. The legislature is influential in policy making without taking 
action. The possibility of Council actions is what matters. Third, holding constant the position 
of the median member of the committee, the relationship between the preferences of the 
legislature median and the equilibrium policy choice of the agency will be negative. The further 
away from the agency's preferred position is L, the better the agency will do in equilibrium (see 
Ferejohn/Shipan 1990:8).  
In a take-it-or-leave-it-rule committee system the dilemma of delegation remains. If x < q, the 
committee would open the gate and the legislature would vote against the proposal leading to 
maintaining the status quo. If C(q) 
￿  x 
￿  q, the committee would open the gate and the policy 
x would be implemented. If x > C(q) the committee is indifferent between opening the gate and 
leaving it closed, the legislature would accept x; in the latter case, x would be implemented 
without involvement of the legislature. As is obvious, under this regime the committee median 
can only realise its ideal point if x = C. Since this ideal point is closer to L than C(L), the 











                                                                                                                                                         
EU context committees have only the exclusive right to open the gate.  
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III. Implementation Procedures  
 
Based on the comitology decision, three main types of implementation procedures can be 
distinguished. In the advisory committee procedure, a committee of representatives gives its 
opinion on a draft measure of the Commission. The Commission has to take into account this 
advice and is obliged to inform the committee about the way in which it has affected its final 
policy choice. This procedure will not be analyzed further in this contribution since it does not 
grant any decision making power to other players than the Commission.
7 
The second type is the management committee procedure.
8 In this procedure the committee of 
representatives gives an opinion on the Commission proposal, based on qualified majority of its 
members. If the committee agrees with the Commission proposal or remains divided, the 
Commission proposal will be implemented. If the committee adopts a different view – which is 
called a 'negative' opinion – the Commission reports its proposal to the Council. The Council 
may only take a decision that deviates from the Commission proposal by qualified majority. If 
the Council agrees with or does not respond to the proposal, the Commission is allowed to 









                                                
7 In the recently submitted Commission proposal (Official Journal 1998, (279/5)), the advisory procedure is 
defined in Article 3, which is identical to the procedure described in the 1987 comitology decision. 
8 In the recently submitted Commission proposal (Official Journal 1998, (279/5)), this procedure is defined in 
Article 4, which drops a variant (a) of the 1987 comitology decision. 
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Figure 2. Gatekeeping procedure (management committee)  
 
The third procedure is the regulatory committee procedure. In this procedure, the Commission 
may only implement its proposal when the committee presents a positive opinion. This is the 
main difference from the management committee procedure. If the committee gives a negative 
opinion, or when the committee does not reach a decision, the Commission has to submit its 
proposal to the Council. A divided committee in this procedure means that the Commission 
proposal has to be submitted to the Council, which increases the involvement of the Council in 
the decision making process. With regard to decision making in the Council, two variants of 
this procedure can be distinguished. In both variants the Council may amend the Commission 
proposal by qualified majority. In variant (a), which will be called the amendment procedure, 
the Commission proposal will be adopted if the Council does not decide otherwise. A Council 
decision tht deviates from the Commission proposal has to be based on a qualified majority. In 
variant (b) the Council may also veto the Commission proposal by simple majority. This 
variant of the regulatory committee procedure is known as the contrefilet procedure. This 
version will be called the veto procedure. The architecture and the outcomes of this procedure 
are shown in fig. 3.  
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Commission  Committee  Council   Council 
￿
   
￿    
￿    
￿                y 
        (new policy)  (open)   (not veto)  (amend) 
 
    (not)       (closed)      (veto)      (not amend) 
 
 
q   x   q   x 
 
Figure 3. Gatekeeping procedure (regulatory committee)  
 
The main difference between the two variants of the regulatory committee procedure, viz., the 
amendment and the veto procedure, is the voting procedure.
9 In the amendment procedure the 
Council can change the Commission proposal only if a qualified majority prefers a different 
point, including the initial status quo. If the Council fails to adopt a different view, the 
Commission proposal will be implemented. In the veto procedure, the Council is able to reject 
the Commission proposal by a simple majority in favor of the initial status quo. In that case, the 
Council has to make a comparison between the status quo post and the status quo ante. If the 
Council prefers the Commission proposal to the status quo ante, it will not use its veto power. 
                                                
9 In the recently submitted Commission Proposal (Official Journal 1998, (279/5)) both variants are dropped. 
Article 5, defining the regulatory procedure, now states: "If the measures envisaged are not in accordance with the 
opinion of the Committee, or if no opinion is delivered, the Commission shall not adopt the measures envisaged. 
In that event, it may present a proposal relating to the measures to be taken in accordance with the Treaty." 
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IV. Commission Policies under the Implementation Procedures  
 
1. Assumptions  
 
To analyse different implementing procedures we use a simple game theoretical model that 
gives a stylised representation of the complex interactions in the actual decision making 
process. In the model we distinguish three types of players, that is, the members of the Council 
of Ministers, the members of the committee of state representatives and the Commission, which 
will be regarded as a unitary actor. These players decide on a policy issue that can be 
represented with a single policy dimension. This dimension may, for example, represent 
regulation on telecommunication, different levels of integration of the internal market, or 
consumer protection. Players are assumed to have single-peaked preferences, which have two 
important properties. First, each player prefers one policy to all other possible policies as the 
outcome of the decision making process. This most preferred policy is represented with 
a player's ideal point on the policy dimension. Second, a player's preference for alternative 
policies depends on their distance from his or her ideal point. The farther away an alternative is 
from a player's ideal point, the less preferred this alternative is. In addition, we assume these 
preferences satisfy the single-crossing property, that is, preference for some alternative between 
two different players is determined by distance, too.
10  
We assume that decisions are made sequentially. The sequence is based on the existing 
procedures that specify the order in which players are allowed to make a move. Players are 
assumed to have complete and  perfect information. This assumption implies that the 
preferences of players, the structure of the game, and the fact that players behave in a rational 
way are assumed to be common knowledge, while only one player is allowed to make a move 
                                                
10 See Enelow/Hinich (1984: 8-13) for an introduction to the spatial theory of voting that is used. 
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at every stage of the game. The characterisation of agent discretion in this paper differs from 
the literature that explores bureaucratic discretion based on informational advantages (see 
Niskanen 1971; Breton and Wintrobe 1975; Miller and Moe 1983) or uncertainty about agent 
preferences (Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast 1989). In this paper agent discretion is based on 
the structure of the principal-agent relationship. This is not to say that information asymmetry 
is not an important source of discretion. The point is that the agent has an additional 
opportunity to deviate from the policies preferred by the legislature. Since we are interested in 
analysing structure-induced discretion, policymaking will be analysed in an environment of 
complete and perfect information.
11 Second, we assume that none of the players prefers its 
decision to be overturned. This preference can be viewed as imposing some cost on a proposal 
that is not the final outcome of the decision making process. These costs are assumed to reduce 
the final payoff to a player. The Commission has an important "first mover" advantage by 
making the initial policy proposal. This proposal has to be regarded as the new common policy, 
unless the Council is able to force the Commission to change its position by introducing a new 
bill. Commission discretion is approached as a set of potential policies that can be selected by 
the Commission without triggering an overturn by the Council. As the Commission is allowed 
to make the first move, it will select its best policy such that the Council cannot pass a bill that 
will change this choice. All implementation games that are considered in this paper have a 
                                                
11 It is an open question whether these assumptions describe a worst case scenario from the point of view of the 
principal. With complete and perfect information the agent as well as the supervisor will never commit an error. 
The agent maximizes its pay offs given the knowledge of the preferences of the other players and the institutional 
structure of decisionmaking. With incomplete information regarding the preferences of the principal and the 
supervisor the agent might be more cautious in approaching its maximum in order to avoid decisions which are 
overridden later on. How this affects the principals pay off needs further analysis. In the spatial voting literature it 
is assumed that all points in the policy space can be implemented. As for the feasibility of a specific policy, the 
Commission has an informational advantage. The Commission can argue that the ideal point of the Council 
Median cannot be implemented, because there is no policy available to reach it. This represents a case of 
13 Schmidtchen and Steunenberg: European Policymaking
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unique, subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, which we take to define the outcome of the game. 
The equilibrium has two important properties: First, the agent selects a policy that will be 
accepted by the supervisor. The principal therefore does not introduce a new bill, so in 
equilibrium no action of the Council will be observed. Second, the public policy that will be 
implemented in equilibrium is not only a result of the preferences of the Commission, but it 
also reflects the constraints generated by the preferences of the supervisor and the Council. The 
Commission anticipates all future courses of action and chooses a policy that will not be 
reversed in a subsequent stage of the game.  
 
2. Qualified majority voting  
 
In the implementing procedures applied in the EU the committee of representatives and the 
Council have to decide by qualified majority. Under qualified majority rule each voter may cast 
a specific number of votes, and a special majority is required to adopt a proposal.
12 This voting 
rule may lead to some complications, which can be illustrated by a five-member Council, 
shown in Figure 4, in which, Li denotes the ideal point of Council member i. Furthermore, Li(x) 
stands for this member's point of indifference to the Commission policy x. That is, Council 
member i prefers the current policy, x, as much as the alternative policy Li(x). Note that Council 
                                                                                                                                                         
information induced agent discretion. The Council knows that the policy is closer to the Commission's ideal point 
than to its median member but it may not be able to do much about it. 
12 See Article 148(2) EC, which specifies this rule for decision making in the Council. From January 1995, and 
after the recent enlargement of the Union, this qualified majority rule implies that proposals need to be adopted 
with a 62/87 majority (71.3% of the votes). Thus 26 votes in the Council were sufficient to block a proposal. 
However, as a result of pressure from Spain and the United Kingdom, a compromise was reached at the European 
Council meeting held in Ioannina, Greece, in March 1994, to the effect that 23-25 opposing votes would ensure the 
continued discussion in the Council for a "reasonable" period until a consensus was obtained. This agreement 
implies that, in fact, a 65/87 majority (74.7% of the votes) is needed for Council approval.  
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member i strictly prefers to the current policy all alternative policies that are found between the 
Commission policy, x, and its point of indifference, Li(x). 
Now assume, for simplicity, that Council members have equivalent vote shares. Then, in a five 
member Council, as illustrated in the figure, four members need to be in favour in order to 
adopt a new policy by a qualified majority of about 75% of the votes. In that case, Council 
members 2 and 4 are pivotal, since they find the ideal points of four Council members to their 
right or left, including their own vote. These two players will be called decisive qualified 




     x       y    L2(x) 
 left    | |    |   |  |  |  |       |     right 
       L1    L2     L3    L4       L5 
     
Figure 4. Qualified majority voting in a five member Council: amendments 
 
If the Commission policy, x, is found to the left of the ideal point of member 2, as in Figure 2, a 
qualified majority (i.e., members 2, 3, 4 and 5) strictly prefers an alternative proposal, y, to the 
current policy, x. Only member 1 prefers the Commission policy to the alternative, so it will 
vote against y. Consequently, if the Council is restricted to choice between x and y, it selects the 
alternative policy, y. However, under the current comitology procedures, the Council may 
amend the Commission proposal. All Council members are allowed to propose an alternative to 
                                                
13 For simplicity, in this paper we assume a five-member Council, and later on, a five-member committee of 
national representatives. However, this (limited) number of Council or committee members does not affect our 
results, since decisive qualified majority members can be defined for any number of members. 
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the Commission policy, x. Using a well-ordered agenda,
14 the Council will then decide on 
a new policy that is equivalent to member 2's ideal point, L2.
15  
A different situation occurs when the Commission policy is found between member 2 and 
member 4 as illustrated in Figure 5. Now the Commission policy, x, divides the members of the 
Council. Members 1 and 2 prefer a policy change to the left, while members 3, 4 and 5 prefer a 
change to the right. However, neither of them is able to propose a new policy that is supported 
by four members. In other words, no qualified majority can be formed against the Commission 
proposal. Consequently, the Council is not able to adopt a new policy, and the Commission can 
implement its proposal.  
 
     L1(x)    L2(x)    x  L3(x)      L4(x)   L5(x) 
 left    |   | |  |  | | |  |   | |   |   right 
           L1   L2   L3   L4   L5 
 
                    Council's blocking set 
 
Figure 5. Qualified majority voting in a five member Council: no amendments 
 
This result indicates that when the Commission selects a policy between the ideal points of the 
decisive qualified majority members 2 and 4, the Council is not able to amend it to another 
point. These proposals form what we call the "blocking" set of Council decision making, since 
the Council cannot form a qualified majority against such a proposal. Commission proposals 
that are located in this interval are invulnerable to amendments. 
                                                
14 We assume that the Council uses a well-ordered agenda in the following sense: first, all proposed amendments 
are collected and ordered according to their deviation from the initial proposal; second, each amendment is 
compared with the initial proposal in a binary vote starting with the amendment that deviates most from the initial 
proposal.   
15 A similar conclusion can be derived for a current policy to the right of member 4 in Figure 4. The Council will 
then select an alternative policy that is equivalent to the ideal point of member 4, L4. 
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The committee of representatives which, like the Council, also decides by qualified majority, 
acts as a gatekeeper in most comitology procedures.
16 It decides whether the Council has to be 
involved in the decision making process. If the committee "opens" its gates, the Council may 
amend the initial proposal. If, however, the committee keeps its gates "closed" and decides to 
accept the Commission proposal, the Council cannot impose its preference on the Commission 
policy. In other words, the committee can only choose between the initial proposal, x, by 
keeping its gates closed, and the amended proposal, y, which it can expect to result from 
opening its gates. As for the Council, proposals may exist that divide the committee of 
representatives, that is, a qualified majority of committee members will prefer neither the initial 
proposal, x, nor the amended policy, y.  
 
3. Modelling the implementation procedures 
 
The implementation procedures can be modelled as sequential games in which the Commission 
moves first (see Steunenberg, Koboldt and Schmidtchen, 1996). In these games, the 
Commission proposes a draft measure or new policy, which has to be considered by 
a committee of national representatives in the second stage. This committee considers the 
Commission proposal, and it may decide by qualified majority whether or not to support the 
Commission. When it disagrees with the Commission, or, depending on the procedure 
involved, when it cannot form an opinion on the proposal, the committee has to submit the 
proposal to the Council. The Council, in the last stage of the game, may decide to reject the 
proposal by simple majority (veto version of the regulatory committee procedure), or propose 
amendments to the proposal by qualified majority (management committee procedure and the 
amendment version of the regulatory committee procedure).  
 
 
                                                
16 See Ferejohn and Shipan (1990: 6-8), Steunenberg (1996: 321-323)and Steunenberg (1992, 1994) for analyses 
of the role of gatekeepers in policy making processes in which an agent may set a policy that will be implemented 
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regime:  1         2       3       4     
     |          |    |            | 
 
     C2(y)          C4(q)   C4(y)      y  q 
 left    |  |    |   | |   | |  |  |  | | |  right 
         C1   C2   C3    L1   C4  L2  C5  L3 
 
Figure 6. Implementing procedures: different regimes for Commission preferences 
 
Knowing the responses of the other players, the Commission selects its best policy such that it 
does not trigger Council involvement. In order to demonstrate the differences in outcomes 
between the different implementing procedures we use a specific preference configuration, 
which is presented in Figure 6. Other preferences that differ from this configuration are 
possible, of course, but may lead to equilibrium outcomes that are less diverse between these 
procedures.
17 Most committee members are assumed to have more progressive preferences than 
their ministers in the Council, while the preference of the Commission is varied along the 
segment of the policy dimension that is found to the left of the median Council member, L3.
18 
The status quo ante, which plays a role in the veto version of the regulatory committee 
procedure, will be denoted as q. This policy, which is the initial policy before the Commission 
has made its proposal, is assumed to be located between L2 and L3.  
Based on points that are critical for the outcome under some procedure, we distinguish four 
different intervals or regimes for Commission preferences in the figure. Regime 1, for example, 
includes Commission preferences to the left of committee member 2's indifference point to y. 
                                                                                                                                                         
unless other players are able to agree on another alternative.  
17 See Steunenberg, Koboldt and Schmidtchen (1996) for more general results, which do not depend on a specific 
configuration of player preferences. 
18 This restriction does not affect our conclusions. The interested reader can easily derive the results for the 
symmetric case of Commission preferences to the right of the median Council member. 
18 German Working Papers in Law and Economics Vol. 2002,  Paper 19
http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2002/iss1/art19  19 
Then, under the management committee procedure, the optimal policy to the Commission is 
C2(y), which leads to an indecisive committee. Keeping its gates closed, the Commission can 
implement its proposal. For the amendment and the veto version of the regulatory committee 
procedure, these optimal proposals are C4(y) and C4(q), respectively. A qualified majority of 
committee members will only support these policies, which are (weakly) prefered to the policy 
the Council will select in the last stage of the game.
19 The equilibrium policies for the four 
different regimes are presented in Table 1, where A denotes an outcome that is equivalent to the 
ideal point of the Commission. 
  
 regime 1 regime 2 regime 3 regime 4 
 
1. management committee procedure C2(y) A A A 
2. regulatory committee procedure: amendment C4(y) C4(y) C4(y) A 
3. regulatory committee procedure: veto C4(q) C4(q) A A 
  
Key to the table: A is the ideal point of the Commission; y is the Council proposal, which is equivalent 
to the ideal point of Council member 2 in Figure 7; q is the status quo ante; C2(y) is the indifference 
point to y for committee member 2; C4(..) is the indifference point to y or q for committee member 4. 
The results presented in this table are based on the propositions presented in Steunenberg, Koboldt and 
Schmidtchen (1996). 
 
 Table 1. Comparative analysis: outcomes for the implementing procedures 
 
Two important observations can be based on these results. First, the Commission is the least 
restricted in selecting a new Community policy under the management committee procedure. It 
may successfully select any new policy between C2(y) and L3 in Figure 6 without any 
interference from the Council. In other words, having a preference for a policy that is found in 
                                                
19 Note that when the Commission proposes a policy that is found in the Council's blocking set, that is, the set of 
policies between L2 and L3 in Figure 6, the Council will not act and therefore accepts the Commission proposal. 
Knowing this, the committee will not open its gates and present a "positive" opinion on the Commission policy. 
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regime 2, 3, or 4, the Commission is able to implement a new policy that is equivalent to its 
own ideal point. Under the regulatory committee procedure, this set of feasible policies is 
reduced to points between C4(y) and L3 for the amendment version (i.e. regime 4), or C4(q) and 
L3 for the veto version (i.e., regimes 3 and 4). The reason for this is that under the management 
committee procedure an indecisive committee may keep its gates closed, while under the 
regulatory committee procedure it is induced to submit the Commission proposal to the 
Council. Only when a qualified majority of committee members prefers the Commission 
proposal to the Council alternative, is it able to present a "positive" opinion, which allows the 
Commission to implement its policy. 
Second, both versions of the regulatory committee procedure lead to different results.
20 The 
veto version allows the Commission to successfully propose a new policy that is equivalent to 
its own ideal point under regimes 3 and 4, while the amendment version restricts this ability of 
the Commission to regime 4 only. In other words, and using the preference configuration in 
Figure 6, the additional veto power of the Council under the contrefilet procedure increases the 
set of proposals that is open to the Commission.
21 This is a result of the policy the Council will 
select in the last stage of the game. In the figure, a majority of Council members prefers the 
status quo ante, q, to the alternative Council policy, y. So, under the veto version, the Council 
will not amend but will consider vetoing the Commission proposal, when it is allowed to make 
its move. Knowing this, the committee will present a "positive" opinion on those Commission 
proposals that are (weakly) prefered to the status quo ante. This allows the Commission to 
select any initial policy up to committee member 4's point of indifference, C4(q). For the 
                                                
20 This is not always the case. The amendment and the veto version of the regulatory committee procedure do not 
differ if the status quo ante, q, is found to the left of the ideal point of Council member 2. Then, the Council will 
not use its veto power, since a qualified majority (and thus also a simple majority) of its members prefers the 
amended policy, y, to the status quo ante, q. 
21 Note that the opposite is true for a configuration where committee member 4 has an ideal point to the right of 
Council member 2 such that C4(q) is found to the right of L2. 
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amendment version, where no veto is available, the Council will either select y or "accept" the 
Commission proposal. 
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V. Measuring agent discretion  
 
The discretion of the Commission in the implementation game to set new policies that coincide 
with its own preferences is affected by the rules of the decision making game as well as by the 
preferences of the other players. The discretion of the Commission can be associated with how 
close the outcomes of a given procedure come to the Commission's ideal point, given different 
constellations of preferences. Clearly, a player is worse off the further away the outcome of the 
implementation game is from its ideal point. Since implementation procedures are used for 
a multitude of decisions about topics on which player preferences may vary, we need to take 
account of these different configurations in order to show how the implementation procedures 
influence agent-discretion of the Commission. In this analysis, in which player preferences will 
be varied, we consider the mean distance between the outcomes and the ideal point of the 
Commission as a proxy for the Commission's discretion. 
We also calculate the mean distance between the outcomes and the ideal point of the Council. 
This mean distance is considered to be a proxy for the legislator's dilemma. The smaller this 
distance the less severe is the legislator's dilemma. Since the European Parliament is also 
legislator, we additionally calculate a mean distance for the Parliament based on the ideal point 
of the median member of the Parliament. 
In order to calculate the mean distance between the outcomes and the ideal points of the players 
under different procedures we make the following simplifying assumptions. First, we assume 
that the ideal points of the players and the status quo ante are distributed at equal distances 
along the policy dimension, and the minimum distance between two possible ideal points is the 
same for all configurations. This minimum distance is denoted as d . Second, the ideal points 
of all decisive players (i.e., the median and decisive Council member, the Commission, the 
decisive members of the committee of representatives, and the median representative in 
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Parliament) may, but need not, differ from each other and may, but need not, differ from the 
status quo ante. Finally, we concentrate on configurations in which the ideal point of the 
Commission and the status quo ante are found to the left of the median Council member, L3. 
We have used this kind of preference in the various figures in the paper. Moreover, without this 
restriction, the number of possible configurations would increase, while the mean distance 
remains the same. The outcomes that will be found for preferences to the right of the median 
Council member just mirror the outcomes for preferences to the left of this player. We assume 
that the preference configurations to which we restrict our analysis are equiprobable.  
Given these simplifying assumptions, the number of feasible preference constellations 
(including a possible status quo ante point) is finite. This number depends on the length of the 
interval over which the ideal points are distributed. In our computations, we use an interval of 
length 7d , which implies that the number of possible values an ideal point may take is 8. The 
mean or expected distances between outcomes and the ideal points of the Commission, the 
Council  and the median member of Parliament are summarised in Table 2.  
 
  
mean distance for:  Commission          Council  median member 
procedure:               of Parliament 
 
1. management committee procedure 0.29            2.46  2.58 
2. regulatory committee procedure: amendment 0.71            2.17  2.36 
3. regulatory committee procedure: veto 1.01            1.87  2.23 
  
 
 Table 2. Mean distance between equilibrium policies and the ideal points of the Commission 
  and the median representatives in Parliament and Council  
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The indices in the table show how the Commission, the Council, and the Parliament are 
affected by the implementing procedures.
22 Focusing on the Commission first, the three 
comitology procedures appear to convey a different amount of discretion to the Commission. 
The mean distance between the outcomes of the implementation games and the preferred policy 
of the Commission is smallest in the management committee procedure and largest in the 
regulatory committee veto procedure. Based on expected distances, the Commission prefers the 
management committee procedure to the regulatory committee procedure, and the amendment 
version of the latter procedure to the veto version. The favourable effect of the veto version for 
the Commission, which we observed in Section IV, depends on the specific preference 
configuration depicted in Figure 6. On average, the veto version of the regulatory committee 
procedure leads to a larger distance between the equilibrium policy and the Commission's ideal 
point, which indicates that this procedure reduces Commission discretion the most.  
The difference in Commission discretion between the management procedure and the 
amendment version of the regulatory committee procedure results from the fact that both 
procedures differ with respect to the consequences of an undecided committee. Whereas, in the 
management committee procedure, a qualified majority is required to open the gates, in the 
regulatory committee procedure the committee must be able to form a qualified majority to 
keep the gates closed. The difference in Commission discretion between the veto version and 
the amendment version of the regulatory committee procedure results from the fact that the 
commission is restricted in the veto version by the possibility that the Council may veto the 
Commission proposal in favour of the status quo ante.  
As the figures for the Council show, the Council is confronted with a legislator's dilemma. This 
dilemma is less serious in the veto version of the regulatory procedure – but it exists! – and is 
                                                
22 We want to stress that neither the absolute nor the relative change in the respective figures should be 
generalised, because the figures are highly sensitive to the assumption about the probability of different preference 
24 German Working Papers in Law and Economics Vol. 2002,  Paper 19
http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2002/iss1/art19  25 
largest in the management procedure. Given these results, the Council's preference over 
different procedures can be written as: (management committee) 
￿  (regulatory committee: 
amendment) 
￿  (regulatory committee: veto). However, it would be a mistake to conclude that 
the Council will always choose the regulatory committee. This procedure involves higher 
opportunity costs than the others, and one would expect this procedure being chosen in very 
sensitive policy areas.  
The Commission's 1994 Annual Report of Activities describes the activities of about 400 
different committees that prepared more than 4,000 opinions covering almost all areas in the 
Union's budget. The activities of these committees cost about 18 million ECU, or on average 
42,400 ECU per committee. The largest proportion of the committees specified in this report 
are advisory committees. They comprise about 42 % of the total number of committees; 17 % 
of the committees are management committees, and 20 % are regulatory committees. Mixed 
cases exist, too (European Parliament 1995b: 9). In another report the Commission indicates 
that in about 30 cases the Commission has had to follow a version of the regulatory committee 
procedure in which the Council can block its decision. However, this rarely occurs. Over the 
last three years there have been only six cases where the Commission decision was referred 
back to the Council, and no cases are known in which no decision was taken (European 
Commission 1995: 22).  
While the European Parliament currently plays an important role in the European legislative 
process, it is not yet formally involved in the decision making process on the implementation of 
measures. It is only the Council which has the exclusive power to intervene at the 
implementation stage. However there is an agreement that the Parliament shall receive agendas 
for committee meetings, draft measures submitted to the committees, and the results of voting; 
                                                                                                                                                         
constellations. Thus we want to consider only implications drawn from the direction of change. 
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it shall also be kept informed wherever the Commission transmits to the Council measures or 
proposals for measures to be taken (see Official Journal 1998, C 279/5).  
Even if Parliament is not involved in the game, it is better off under the regulatory committee 
procedures, among which the veto version is better for the Parliament. This is based on the 
condition that both the Commission and Parliament have more progressive preferences 
concerning European integration than the Council; that is, both are found to the left of the 
median Council member.
23 Under this condition, we expect the Parliament to rank the three 
comitology procedures opposite to the Commission. It prefers the veto version of the regulatory 
committee procedure to the amendment version, and the amendment version to the 
management committee procedure. The figures show that the legislator's dilemma is more 
serious for the European Parliament in comparison to the Council. That is the reason why the 
Parliament has always been interested in gaining a foothold in the implementation process.
24 
From the analysis of the implementation procedures we can derive the following general 
results:  
￿  A procedure requiring a qualified majority in the committee to open the gates restricts agent 
discretion to a lesser degree than a rule requiring a qualified majority to keep the gates 
closed.  
￿  Adding a new outcome option in form of the status quo ante restricts the agent more than the 
possibility of an amendment to the Commission proposal (= status quo post).  
￿  Combining the amendment and veto version of the regulatory procedure by introducing an 
additional player, for example the European Parliament, reduce agent discretion the most 
(see Steunenberg/Schmidtchen 2000).  
                                                
23 See also Garrett (1992) and Tsebelis (1994: 132), who assume that the Commission and most members of 
Parliament are more pro integration than Council members on a policy dimension that presents positions towards 
European integration.  
24 See Steunenberg/Schmidtchen 2000, where alternative procedures with parliamentary involvement are analysed. 
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What has not been shown in the paper is the following.  
￿  If a committee can decide by simple majority whether or not a Commission proposal has to 
be considered by the Council before it can be implemented, Commission discretion is less 
than in the management procedure and has the some level as in the regulatory amendment 
procedure.  
Why should the Council delegate policy-making authority to the Commission, or confer 
monitoring authority on a committee, if it risks ending up with a policy not in accordance with 
its ideal position? The reason for delegating policy-making authority is to achieve efficiency 
gains that otherwise would not be available; the Council simply does not have the competence 
and the time to take the correct policy-decision. The same argument holds for the delegation of 
monitoring power. The difference L – x measures the agency costs (= costs of delegation) 
which have to be balanced against the benefits of delegation.  
A last question remains to be answered: Why does the Council permit the committee median, 
C, to be different from L? There are several possible explanations for committee outliers (see 
also Ferejohn/Shipan 1990: 9). First, it is not the Council delegating some of its members 
monitoring power. Rather, each government decides independently about whom to send off 
into a committee. Second, a state belonging to a minority in the Council might attempt to 
implement its favoured policy by influencing the median position in the committee. Third, 
a principal might delegate power in order to solve a self-commitment problem. Fourth, the 
committee is captured by the agency. The latter (and its clients) work to shift committee 
preferences over policy "in a manner sympathetic to the agency" (Ferejohn/Shipan 1990: 9). 
Fifth, the Council may find perfect compliance to be excessively costly. Imperfect compliance 
of a committee is another cost of delegation to be balanced against the benefits derived from 
saving the costs of monitoring and sanctions.  
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VI. Conclusion  
 
Political theory holds that policy decisions in a representative democracy are responsive to the 
interests of citizens. A lot of institutional safeguards such as elections create incentive 
structures for elected representatives to respond to the interests and preferences of the 
citizenship. But policy making requires delegation of authority to unelected bureaucrats. How 
can elected political officials assure that bureaucracies do what political officials want them to 
do in order to retain and secure office?  
We have analysed several policy making procedures, which are commonly known as 
"comitology". Our main findings are that the three comitology procedures differ as for their 
contribution to overcome the dilemma of delegation. The advisory committee procedure does 
not restrict the Commission in the slightest way. Both the management and the regulatory 
procedure impose some restrictions on the Commission, with the regulatory procedure being 
most restrictive.  
We used a three-tier description of the architecture of decisionmaking in the European Union. 
In fact the European architecture is much more complex. The European Parliament and the 
Council can be either principals or agents. Both serve as agents as far as the people are 
concerned; both are principals with respect to the European Commission. Thus, we have 
actually a higher-order vertical structure, forming a network of overlapping or nested 
principal/agent relationships (Tirole 1986: 181). Also, horizontal elements can be superimposed 
on the vertical structure (see Tirole 1986). For example, the Commission can be monitored by 
several supervisors. There may also be repercussions from the implementation stage to the 
legislative stage of decision making which we neglected as well as correlation between the 
preferences of the different players. For example, if most members of Parliament and the 
Commission have similar preferences, Parliament may benefit from those procedures which 
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restrict the Commission least. In selecting a policy that is close to its ideal point, the 
Commission will also set a policy that is in line with the preferences of Parliament.  
Our paper analyses the principal-agent relationship in a constitutional law and economics 
context (see Schmidtchen/Cooter 1997), which requires a focus on procedures (institutions) as a 
means for inducing agent compliance. We did not analyse methods of monitoring and 
punishing the Commission. In fact, we have in Europe a mix of both measures. Whether it is an 
optimal mix remains to be analysed. 
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